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Abstract
Ethnic fragmentation is a variable increasingly used in the economic
literature to explain diﬀerences in economic development level, growth or
the incidence of conﬂicts. Nearly all articles have in common that they
treat ethnic fragmentation as a static, exogenous fact. Only recently some
contributions outlined ﬁrst ideas, why diﬀerent levels of ethnic fragmenta-
tion evolved based on biodiversity and evolutionary theories.
This article has two main goals. In connecting with these recent ﬁnd-
ings, the article boldly conﬁrms their results that a ‘base-level’ of fragmen-
tation evolved due to geographical and evolutionary factors. Additionally,
it draws the attention to the impact of colonization on fragmentation, es-
pecially on how a country was colonized. The main goal, however, is to
show that ethnic fragmentation is not only evolving over centuries, but
changes over a short period of time. As static factors, e.g. geographical
ones, can’t be responsible for changes in the short run, the article oﬀers a
structured assessment of factors that may inﬂuence diversity levels in the
short term. Although migration is the most obvious factor, urbanization
and especially education play an even more important role in inﬂuencing
a country’s ethnic boundaries.
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ity.
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11 Introduction
‘‘Every valley is still a little world that diﬀers from neighboring world as Mercury
does from Uranus’’ (Weber, 1976, p. 47). In this quote Weber is not referring
to a developing country in the heart of the African continent where ethnic
heterogeneity is claimed to be at the roots of its growth tragedies1. Instead, it
is a citation of an economist describing France in the second half of the 19th
century. Only 36 out of 89 d´ epartments were fully French-speaking, and Weber
(1976) concludes that ‘‘French was a foreign language for a substantial number
of Frenchmen, including almost half the children who would reach adulthood
in the last quarter of the century’’ (Weber, 1976, p. 67). Despite the language
heterogeneity, Weber describes in great detail how diversity was persistent in
every part of life, from cultural traits over measurement systems, currencies
and various beliefs in contrast to the oﬃcially proclaimed Christianity. Some
decades later, in the middle of the 20th century, demographic estimates already
showed the more common picture of France as the homogenous grande nation2.
This paves the way to investigate the dynamics of a country’s ethnic di-
versity3 and to question the static nature on which most economic literature
bases their analyses of the role of ethnic diversity4. Although most authors
admit that there is some endogeneity involved, they do not pursue this fact
further and proclaim that fragmentation is at least not changing over a short
period of time5. But, in a time where conﬂicts, migration and globalized trade
are shaping countries and their populations, shouldn’t one be able to observe
rather huge shifts in a country’s ethnic set-up?
In contrast to this literature, some recent publications try to shed some more
light on what roots diversity might have and why it developed so diﬀerently over
the globe. Ahlerup and Olsson (2007) analyze the inﬂuence of human settle-
ment. The duration of uninterrupted settlement leaves more time to diverge
1See the inﬂuential paper of Easterly and Levine (1997) about ‘Africa’s growth tragedy’.
2H´ eran et al. (2002) assess that less than 10% of parents did not speak French with their
children in 1950.
3Ethnic fragmentation and diversity is used in this article interchangeable, which is quite
common in most of the literature. However, diversity is a much more elaborated aspect of
ethnicity because it requires to take (dis)similarities between groups into account. For a
methodological-technical discussion of the prerequisites to measure diversity, see Bossert et
al. (2003) and Nehring and Puppe (2002). For the assessment of a new index to capture
ethnic diversity, see Kolo (2011a).
4For a more detailed overview of pathways through which diversity is aﬀecting the economic
outcome of a country via its inﬂuence on institutional and policy drivers of growth, see for
example Alesina and La Ferrara (2005). For a good overview of diversity’s inﬂuence on conﬂict
incidence, type and duration, see additionally Garcia-Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2003).
5A rare exception is Fedderke et al. (2008) with a case study on South Africa. They employ
changing values of racial fragmentation for each decade in their analysis on its role on economic
growth.
2into diﬀerent groups, leading to an increased diversity. The existence of modern
sates and its institutions lowered a country’s fractionalization6. Additionally,
policies might directly or indirectly promote ‘assimilation’.
Michalopoulos (2008) bases his article on Darwin’s evolutionary theory. He
argues that various geographical conditions are ‘‘the ultimate cause of the emer-
gence and persistence of ethnic diversity’’ (Michalopoulos, 2008, p. 2). These
diﬀerent settings in turn lead to the emergence of diﬀerent species adapted to
their speciﬁc niche, which is also true for the modern human.
Whereas both Michalopoulos (2008) and Ahlerup and Olsson (2007) explore
rather long-term historical and geographical determinants of diversity, Campos
and Kuzeyev (2007) analyse changes in heterogeneity in the former Soviet re-
publics after the fall of the Iron Curtain. Their approach thus comes closest
to the intention of this paper. They show that over the decade that followed
1989 ethnic fractionalization decreased in most countries, language diversity did
not change signiﬁcantly and religious diversity demonstrated a slight increase7.
Unfortunately, Campos and Kuzeyev (2007) remain with these ﬁndings and do
not try to analyze empirically the reasons for the diﬀerent changes.
Using new data, this article supports the above ﬁndings that a ‘base-level’
of diversity evolved due to a set of geographical and historical variables. It
additionally oﬀers a new interpretation of colonization’s impact on shaping a
country’s diversity. The approach the colonial powers followed in their pursuit
plays the most important role. The main ﬁnding of this article is that diversity
did already change over the rather short period of twenty years. Static factors
can’t be responsible for these dynamics. Migration is the most obvious factor
in a more integrated and globalized world, which is conﬁrmed by this study.
However, it shows that urbanization and especially education play a signiﬁcant
and even more important role.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 ethnicity is
shortly framed and the major views on its dynamics are introduced. Section
3 structures and discusses the various drivers that might be responsible for
changes in a country’s ethnic set-up. Section 4 outlines the empirical strategy
and discusses the data sources used, their coverage, limitations and ﬁrst insights
into descriptive statistics. Section 5 then controls the empirical signiﬁcance of
the drivers for a wide range of countries. Finally, section 6 summarizes the key
ﬁndings, concludes and gives an outlook for further research.
6See also Ranis (2009), who argues that kinship relationships are a mere compensation for
not existing oﬃcial social security networks.
7For a discussion of ‘association webs’ between various forms of fractionalization and other
social, political and institutional dimensions in a case study for South Africa, see Fedderke
and Luiz (2007).
32 Framing ethnicity
In line with most of the economic literature, this paper relies on the ethno-
linguistic fractionalization index (ELF) as a measure for a country’s ethnic
set-up. Mostly, a combination of ethnic, language and religious characteristics
are used to assess the ethno-linguistic groups of a country8. It was ﬁrst calcu-
lated in this context by Taylor and Hudson (1972) and was then continuously
used in the economics literature. The ELF is calculated based on a Herﬁndahl
concentration index:




i), i = 1,...N (1)
where pi are the relative group sizes. The measure ranges between zero (only
one group and thus complete homogeneity) and one (complete heterogeneity).
It reﬂects the probability that two randomly selected individuals from a pop-
ulation come from diﬀerent groups and generally increases with the number of
groups9. However, to deﬁne ethnic heterogeneity and its measurement does not
yet explain why ethnic groups formed and why these groups should be subject
to change. Two main schools of thought try to explain this fact: an evolutionary
and a constructivist one.
van den Berghe (1981) sees ethnic groups as nothing but an extension of
the concept of kinship. This purely nepotistic behavior is observed in all mam-
mal species and is the result of an evolutionary survival strategy. Living in an
environment with only limited resources, sticking with your kin, led to ‘‘greater
reproductive success and tend[s] to dominate all populations’’ (Ahlerup and
Olsson, 2007, p. 6). As these kinship groups grew, they developed common
(cultural) traits or markers to sustain the structure also for a more extended
group. Horowitz (1985) sees no ‘‘bright line to be drawn between kinship and
ethnicity, especially in societies where the range of recognized family relation-
ships is wide and the importance of kinship ties is great’’ (Horowitz, 1985, p.
60). All these dynamics thus proved as eﬃcient evolutionary concepts serving
8See for example Alesina et al. (2003), and Fearon (2003), who build their measures on
this combined taxonomy. For more details on language groups and the mutual diﬀerences,
see Lewis (2009) and Fearon (2003). For some speciﬁc analysis on the role of religion, see
for example Guiso et al. (2004) or Barro and McCleary (2003) and Garcia-Montalvo and
Reynal-Querol (2003) for the role of religious polarization.
9For details on other measures, see Garcia-Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2003, 2005, 2008)
for an index of polarization, Posner (2004) on his restricted index of politically relevant ethnic
groups, and Fearon (2003) for the idea of ethnic distance that is further explored by Kolo
(2011a).
4to enforce rules, avoiding free riding and sustain loyalty within the group10.
On the other hand, more recent factors and the emergence of nations also
left their traces on the development or construction of ethnic groups. Accord-
ing to this constructivist view, major changes from early human development
to modern national states did have a huge eﬀect. According to Olsson (2007),
this process started as people became sedentary farmers. This in turn led to an
unprecedented population growth and for the ﬁrst time to the emergence of spe-
cialists’ class within the population. Subsequently, the formation of nations and
modern states shaped and changed the group construction and identiﬁcation
drastically.
This article does not want to reconcile these two groups. For the main
argument of this article that ethnic boundaries are subject to change, both oﬀer
a comprehensible argumentation. In analysing drivers of changes in a country’s
ethnic set-up, both approaches subsequently deliver potential explanations and
inﬂuential factors.
Some theoretical frameworks and mathematical models oﬀer additional mo-
tivation for the dynamics of changing ethnic boundaries. Constant and Zimmer-
mann (2007) discuss in a simple framework the main strategies of immigrants
with respect to their ethnic heritage. According to them, immigrants follow
either an assimilation, integration, marginalization or a separation strategy.
Depending on the strategy chosen diﬀerent eﬀects on the ethnic composition in
the destination country would emerge. Darity et al. (2006) use an evolutionary
game theory model to show diﬀerent ’acculturation’ outcomes linked with the
potential wealth accumulation in the overall society. Ahlerup and Olsson (2007)
build their model on kinship-based social organization providing public goods.
Caselli and Coleman (2008) discuss a model of coalition formation based on the
excludability of others. They root the emergence of conﬂicts in on the possibil-
ity to exclude the defeated group from the seized assets. Lazear (1999) model
assimilation processes of language groups to sustain or ameliorate trade. Kolo
(2011b) extends this approach and covers the main dynamics this article tries
to prove empirically. It balances the gains of increased trade possibilities due
to learning a new language with the costs of doing so. The costs are strongly
inﬂuenced by the proximity of two languages and the infrastructure both for
learning as well as trading. Trading gains in turn are deﬁned by the size of
trade partners, i.e. the size of the respective language groups. The extended
model shows that with a rising development, a continuous process of assim-
ilation into the majority group is expected. Increasing education lowers the
10Finally, Ranis (2009) points out that the kinship relationships are a good substitute for
social security networks and that they can be eﬃcient in providing public goods.
5costs of learning and more individuals would decide in favor of an assimilation.
Higher transportation costs (or less integration or infrastructure) decrease the
value of the trade option and would thus make an assimilation less probable.
Migration is not speciﬁcally covered in the model. However, with an increasing
exchange and trade, migration also gets more important. A higher develop-
ment level would increasingly attract immigrants and would render it - at least
in the short-term - more heterogeneous. Thus, the model of Kolo (2011b) gives
some ﬁrst points of reference for the further discussion of potential drivers for
a changing ethnic set-up.
3 Drivers of diversity change
Ethnic boundaries that are based on tradition, ancestry and conveyed habits,
are certainly nothing that is subject to instant ﬂuctuation. However, the envi-
ronment, in which generations are raised, be it economically, socially or educa-
tionally, should leave their marks and thus lead to a changing ethnic identiﬁca-
tion; especially in an increasing globalizing world. A key diﬀerence between the
prospective drivers for change might be their time dimension. The geographic
outline of a country is ﬁxed. The access to remote areas can be alleviated, but
this is rather a policy decision regarding infrastructure than a per se change in
geographical conditions. Others, can change rather quickly and are susceptible
to political inﬂuence. Depending on the ease of change, the variables can be
categorized within two groups: evolutionary and historical factors, as well as
socioeconomic and policy factors.
3.1 Evolutionary and historical factors
Location and geographical conditions One of the most basic location
characteristics of a country is its latitude. Michalopoulos (2008) points to the
fact that biodiversity is decreasing with the distance from the equator. Cashdan
(2001) roots the high biodiversity around the equatorial region to its tropical
climate, the associated habitat diversity, and its higher pathogen load. The
lack of climate variability in tropical areas leads to specialization regarding a
very speciﬁc environment or niche. Areas with high climatic variability (e.g.
hot summer — cold winter) lead to a more generalized approach and lower
variation. Additionally, a country that is covered in large parts by mountains
oﬀers more niches and at the same time makes an exchange between valleys
much more diﬃcult. For both reasons, one would expect more mountainous
countries to be more diverse. Large countries that cover a huge area should
6encompass more bio-geographic niches and should thus demonstrate a greater
diversity.
Human development The historical duration of uninterrupted human set-
tlement since centuries basically left more time for humans to diverge into
diﬀerent groups. Ahlerup and Olsson (2007) rebuild the way in which the mod-
ern human migrated from its birthplace in East Africa to all other parts of the
world. In doing so, the development follows a constant process of genetic frac-
tionalization. Michalopoulos (2008) underlines the importance of geographical
conditions in catalyzing the emergence of diﬀerent human groups. Whereas
more time since the emergence of the modern human already leads to a diversi-
ﬁcation just based on genetic mutations, geographical conditions help to shape
and maintain diversity in the various locations. Ahlerup and Olsson (2007)
direct attention to Papua New Guinea for an example as to how both drivers
jointly aﬀect ethnic diversity. Its special geography spans a wide array of bio-
geographic niches, and its long population time of some 65,000 years led to
many isolated and distinct ethnic and language groups. Some 860 indigenous
languages spoken within a total population of only around 4 million inhabitants
are still reported today11.
Modern state history and colonization Modern states with their insti-
tutions can play a decisive role in homogenizing countries. Well functioning
institutions that include codiﬁed laws, security and military protection ren-
dered ethnic and cultural forms of interaction less important12 and should have
led to an assimilation process into the major group. Olsson and Hibbs (2005)
point to the transformation from a hunter-gatherer economy to sedentary agri-
cultural production as one of the most important events in shaping societies.
This transition led to a very basic set of institutions, which led to an increase in
productivity. This in turn was the basis for the development of a non-producing
class. Freeing this class from production obligations left room for the develop-
ment and organization of knowledge leading to the expansion of science, tech-
nology, and state formation. The time since this agricultural transition is thus
supposed to be a factor inﬂuencing civilizations and their respective diversity13.
11The 860 languages represent over one tenth of the world’s total (Lewis, 2009).
12See for example Greif (1993) on an example of ancient trade relationships in the Maghreb
region.
13Ahlerup and Olsson (2007) explore how experiences with a modern state over the last
hundred years signiﬁcantly reduced diversity. Yet they admit that causality in this aspect is
not clear, and more homogeneous countries might have developed a modern state more easily
and thus earlier in history.
7In many developing countries the arrival of colonizers meddled lastingly
with existing structures and it is a signiﬁcant factor that created and shaped
countries and societies. Colonizers tried to introduce their legal and political
systems. Often they additionally forced their own language on the occupied
countries. From a language point of view, Latin America displays a strong
homogeneity as Spanish was widely adopted. The same is true of many French-
speaking countries in Africa. The identity of the colonizer and the time span
of colonization might be crucial factors for changes in ethnic boundaries. This
leads to an argument by Acemoglu et al. (2001). Depending on the interest of
the colonial power, they either pursued the ‘divide-and-rule’ approach and just
exploited the country without any long term interest (mainly in Africa) or did
indeed establish institutions to sustain a long term development and settlements
(e.g. Canada, Australia or Singapore). Acemoglu et al. (2001) attribute these
two approaches to the diﬀerences in living conditions the colonizer came upon
at that time. They measure these conditions as the mortality rate among
the Europeans arriving in their respective colonies. In countries with higher
mortality rates, the colonizers did not want to create lasting structures and
institutions targeted on long term settlements. A more extractionary approach
speciﬁcally exploited diﬀerences between groups, deepened them and spurred
the groups on each other. This was pursued by the Belgians in Rwanda with
the Hutu-Tutsi split still in the twentieth century14. In countries with higher
mortality rates that were subsequently exploited and experienced lower levels
of institutional developments one might ﬁnd a higher degree of ethnic diversity.
3.2 Socioeconomic and policy factors
Demographic factors The global international migrant stock rose between
1960 and 2005 from 77 million to 195 million people (World Bank, 2009). Cole-
man (2009) sees immigration as the primary reason responsible for an increasing
diversity with respect to ancestry, ethnic origins, and religions that will have
long-term changing eﬀects on the population make-up.
Sch¨ uler and Weisbrod (2010) analyze whether the eﬀect of ethnic hetero-
geneity on economic performance changes when migration as a cause of higher
diversity is taken into account. They conclude that migrants increase trade as
they import information about their home country, thereby reducing transac-
tion costs and simultaneously increasing trade due to their preferences for home
country products. However, they do not analyze what impact immigration has
14For a broader discussion of the ‘divide-and-rule’ strategy as a principle of mere exploita-
tion, see Ahlerup and Olsson (2007). For the Rwandan case, see also Caselli and Coleman
(2008), who discuss their theoretical model with this conﬂict.
8on the diversity level of a country that may be signiﬁcant15.
Fertility rates and population growth are aﬀected by a wide range of fac-
tors. Ultimately, not only a woman’s personal experience but also her heritage
plays a decisive role16. Diﬀerent preferences of fertility rates between a coun-
try’s historic population and immigrant groups might be important. Most host
countries (mainly developed countries) experienced their fertility transition,
signiﬁcantly lowering the birth per women, earlier than most less developed
countries, where many immigrants originate. This might have a signiﬁcant im-
pact on the destination countries17. For Coleman (2009), these diﬀerences are
the second most important driver of a shift in diversity.
A rising population density will mainly aﬀect very small countries. The
growth of metropolitan regions might be more susceptible for changes in a
broader set of countries. The population density in urban areas might even
increase when the country density remains constant due to high rural-urban
migration ﬂows. Cashdan (2001) showed in her work on biodiversity that an
increased density of species leads to a higher degree of specialization on a smaller
area and thus ﬁnally to a higher diversity. Urban areas are an agglomeration
of people all struggling over limited resources. Thus an coordination along eth-
nic ties to better sustain economic or social development could be expected.
However, as the newly arriving population needs to interact with the existing
masses, an integration into this mainstream is also expectable. In Bates (2006)
one ﬁnds the argument that urbanization erodes cultural foundations and re-
places ethnic ties with rather interest-based liasons. This could have an eﬀect on
the ethnic diﬀerences between groups. Ethnic borders become less pronounced
leading to a more homogeneous civilization. Finally the demographic set-up
in terms of the age structure ought to have implications for the transmission
of ethnic traits, language or religion between generations. In countries with an
exploding population, the relation between youth and parents or older members
of the communities is decreasing very fast. The continuously transmission from
cultural traits might be less intense and the possibility of an assimilation to a
new or adapted ‘youth culture’ or a ‘main stream culture’ might be higher18.
15Especially their diversity measure does not change even for high immigration countries.
16Fernandez and Fogli (2009) ﬁnd that the heritage-induced fertility is a signiﬁcant and
persistent factor within second generation immigrant mothers in the United States.
17Hispanic and Asian ‘minority’ groups in the United States are projected to account for
around 36% of the total population by 2050 (Coleman, 2009). For a detailed analysis of the
emergence of mixed ethnic groups in the United States, see Perez and Hirschman (2009).
18For a discussion on the diﬀerences between vertical and horizontal transmission of culture,
see Bisin and Verdier (2001), Saez-Marti and Sj¨ ogren (2007) or Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009).
9Conﬂicts A wide set of literature tries to link an increased conﬂict incidence
with higher ethnic diversity19. The reverse causal chain is not addressed so far
in empirical papers but some theoretical models capture this dynamic20. What
remains unquestioned is that the various forms of conﬂict has a signiﬁcant
impact on a country’s population. This might be a direct one as for instance
death from prosecution or combat, or through refugee-induced migration. Not
only on the country where the conﬂict is rooted, but also on the neighboring
countries. The violent construction of ethnic identities, ethnic cleansing and
genocides are the most brutal form in this regard. In line with the constructivist
view, additionally, the question arises, whether ethnic identities arise or are
shaped in the onset of ethnic conﬂicts. Elites might agitate their peers and
strategically use potentially salient ethnic divisions for their ambitions. Fearon
and Laitin (2000) analyze a wide range of case studies concluding that elites,
but in some cases also ordinary folk, systematically construct ethnic identities
in order to strengthen or seek their hold on power21.
Economic factors There is a growing literature on factors beneﬁting the
economic growth of a country, including various measures of institutions, ﬁnan-
cial indicators, trade, education or infrastructure22. Thus, it would be obvious
to include GDP ﬁgures in the regressions. However, it is hard to see why the
economic development level per se should have altering eﬀects on the ethnic
diversity of a country if not through various variables highly linked to it. To
better elaborate which of these variables aﬀect heterogeneity, a set of variables
highly linked to the GDP per capita measures is included.
As Olsson and Hibbs (2005) discussed, there are structural changes within
an economy over its development path. A diﬀerent economic structure could be
more susceptible to diﬀerent values of diversity. Gellner (1983) reasons that the
industrial revolution and the accompanying higher division of production steps
led to a need for higher homogenization. To face the new division of labor and
eﬃciently work together, there was a need for a certain level of assimilation or
homogeneity.
19The ﬁrst to analyze the eﬀect of ethnic diversity on conﬂicts were Collier and Hoeﬄer
(1998). Subsequently, Fearon and Laitin (1999) analyzed the question with a focus on minority
groups, Collier (1998) with a focus on democratic institutions and Fearon (2003) with a more
general approach.
20See for example Caselli and Coleman (2008) or Darity et al. (2006) and more generally
Ahlerup and Olsson (2007).
21Fearon and Laitin (2000) also give a good general overview of the theory on social con-
struction of ethnic identities.
22An exemplary selection of papers analyzing economic growth factors that also deal with
ethnic diversity are Alesina and La Ferrara (2005); Bellini et al. (2009); Collier (2000); Easterly
and Levine (1997); Mauro (1995) and Sachs (2001).
10Assimilation might not only take place within one economy, but can also
have the eﬀect of a mutual rapprochement between two diﬀerent countries. For
Janeba (2004), imported Western products are responsible to crowd out locally
manufactured goods and might even marginalize local culture. In general, trade
makes a higher variety of (foreign) products available and normally also reduces
the price of these goods. The access and a low relative price decrease the
overall cost of non-conformity with the own culture and paves the way to a
more globalized or generalized culture. If the increased choice of products wash
out the ethnic identity of a country, the group of people still sticking to the old
habits can be worse oﬀ than in autarky when everybody was conform to their
preferences23. In some constellations of his model, this might even outweigh
the gain of trade.
For international trade, language might play a special role, because a com-
mon language facilitates trade (Lazear, 1999). The knowledge of a main inter-
national language should give an advantage to a country’s group that speaks
this language natively. But all others also have an incentive to learn the (eco-
nomically) dominant language and to understand or familiarize oneself with
this language24.
Institutions and policy factors Institutions in general and their underlying
ideology might play an important role. The development of state structures,
codiﬁed law, governing institutions and a common military protection changed
the mode of living together. Ethnic identity might always be in some ﬁeld of
tension with a nation state promoting cultural similarity and integration. The
relationship between ethnic diversity, the emergence of institutions and vice
versa is not completely clear. Institutions can grant equality, human rights and
freedom to pursue cultural expressions. They can also be used as an excessive
form of nationalism, excluding culturally deviant citizens with various forms of
pressure or even brutality25. This kind of uniforming policy can be present in
all forms of state activities, always with the intention of considerably altering
the ethnic composition of the national state. In forming a French identity, as
outlined in the introduction, the mode was rather peaceful. In the last century,
some examples showed an unimaginable brutality.
23Dreher (2006) for example proxy social globalization inter alia with the number of Mc-
Donald’s restaurants.
24For Leeson (2005), learning a language is a form of signaling that the distant individual
has a strong desire to trade as he bears the high costs of assimilation (learning a foreign
language, adapting to new customs or joining a new religion).
25For a discussion of the blurred transition between ethnicity and nationalism, see Eriksen
(1991).
11Linked with institutions, the question of the role of democracy is inevitable.
Both Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) and Collier (1998) show that more demo-
cratic regimes moderate the potential detrimental eﬀect of ethnic fractional-
ization on the economic development. This could indicate a more tolerant
environment in democratic countries in which more diverse views are accepted.
Campos and Kuzeyev (2007) hold the more tolerant environment of democrati-
zation in the former Soviet republics after the fall of the Iron Curtain responsible
for an increased religious heterogeneity. However, this might have been a spe-
cial case, as religious activity was especially disregarded under the communist
regime. More autocratic or dictatorial regimes that are mostly built around a
very nationalistic ideology might display a signiﬁcantly lower diversity. Again,
the role of democratic regimes and the direction of causality is not clear26. How-
ever, there is some indication that this kind of political regime at least leaves
more room for cultural activity, which might be represented in a more diverse
religious or ethnic identiﬁcation27.
Education plays a key role for the development of a country (Barro, 1999;
Knack and Keefer, 1997) and for its democratization (Akdede, 2010; Barro,
1999). Bolt and Bezemer (2009) well describe the diﬀerent eﬀects education
might have. In a general interpretation education increases one’s human capital.
Being endowed with higher human capital one’s social and economic vulnera-
bility declines. Less vulnerable groups need less to rely on ethnic diﬀerentiation
or identiﬁcation to pursue their (economic) activities. It also increases toler-
ance and leads to more rational decisions. Both eﬀects back the argument, that
ethnic identiﬁcation becomes less important with an increasing education.
Transporting a common history and culture can lead to a better mutual
understanding but can also be used as a form of exerting an inﬂuence over the
young citizens. Education is in the context of this paper also interpreted as a
strong expression of state power. Bolt and Bezemer (2009) subsume this under
the educations’ ‘‘purpose of cultural repression’’ (Bolt and Bezemer, 2009, p.
28). For minorities education often includes language education, as they might
have been raised in their native language28. It seems that the early education
26Collier (1998), for example, discusses, how more democratic regimes might emerge only
or more easily in countries where ethnic diﬀerences are less problematic.
27An interesting other aspect is discussed in Bezemer and Jong-A-Pin (2008). They try to
ﬁnd support for the thesis that the combination of democracy and globalization makes conﬂict
in countries with an ethnic minority dominating the market more probable. However, they
only ﬁnd limited support for this thesis in Sub-Saharan Africa.
28Turkey, for example, still partly prohibits the native Kurdish language and promotes an
education system exclusively in Turkish. Aimed at marginalizing this culture and to in repress
its minorities, it still uses discriminatory language in school books (European Commission,
2006).
12has the most signiﬁcant eﬀects, as it is the ﬁrst time when in many countries
a young citizen is confronted with the inﬂuence of state institutions. The shift
from no schooling to primary schooling is thus probably the most important
one. A country with a higher primary enrollment rate or educational coverage
thus might be more homogeneous. The impact and role of higher (secondary
or tertiary) education is, however, less obvious29.
Despite geographical hurdles, modern forms of infrastructure and communi-
cation make an exchange between remote areas possible. Roads, on which goods
and services may travel, are crucial to start business with the so far ‘outside
world’. Infrastructure can counterbalance geographical disadvantages to enable
participation in national or international trade30. Accordingly, Cashdan (2001)
shows that ethnic diversity is indeed lower where land and water transportation
are more eﬃcient. One would expect the same to result from the analysis of
this article.
4 Empirical strategy and data
To connect with the existing literature, some of the key results of Ahlerup
and Olsson (2007) and Michalopoulos (2008) of a ‘base-level’ of diversity are
reproduced. This analysis takes up the eﬀects of the evolutionary and historical
factors discussed in section 3 that will stay constant or will not change also over
long periods of time. The corresponding ordinary least square (OLS) regressions
are for:
ELFi = β0 + βi · Xi + ǫi (2)
where ELFi are the ELF levels in country i. Xi is a vector of the various
independent variables, and ǫi is a random error term. The model uses het-
eroskedasticity robust estimators.
Having analyzed the static variables inﬂuencing ELF levels, some new in-
sights as to how diversity is changing over a rather short period is the focus
of the second step. An adjusted growth model taking into account level data
that does not change over the period and the relevant variables that should
be responsible for the change of ELF levels is used here. The linear regression
29Barro (1999) also ﬁnds diﬀerences in terms of explanatory power of the various education
levels on democratization. Whereas average years of attainment and the gender gap at the
primary level have high explanatory power, secondary and higher levels of education do not.
30For a detailed survey of infrastructure and their impact on trade ﬂows, see Limao and
Venables (2001).
13model is speciﬁed as follows:
∆ELFi = β0 + βi · Zi + γi · ∆Xi + ǫi (3)
where ∆ELFi is the change of the ELF value of country i between the two
observation points. Vector Zi contains level data that is static (e.g. country
size) and was analyzed in the previous section. These factors are controlled, as
the timing or magnitude of changes could be inﬂuenced by their presence. In a
very mountainous country, diversity might be much more stable than in a small
country that does not have any geographical barriers. ∆Xi instead contains
the relevant changes of the socioeconomic and policy variables over the period
covered. ǫi is a random error term, and again, the model uses heteroskedasticity
robust estimators.
The key question for the empirical operationalization is which source for the
ELF values should be applied. Deﬁning ethnic groups is very much liable to the
subjective decision of its authors. Combining two sources over diﬀerent points in
time is highly diﬃcult. A distinction between diﬀerences in deﬁnitions and real
changes in a country’s ethnic set-up is all but impossible. The only data source
that oﬀers ethnic diversity data on two points in time is the Atlas Narodov Mira
(ANM) compiled by Russian ethnographers (Bruk, 1964; Bruk and Puˇ ckov,
1986). Although only the ﬁrst edition of the Atlas Narodov Mira (Bruk, 1964)
is widely used in the literature, there is a second edition from the mid-1980s
(Bruk and Puˇ ckov, 1986)31. Some later critique centered around the ANM’s
bias to a higher linguistic than ethnic split of groups. This underscores the
fractionalization in regions like Latin America, where Spanish is widely spoken
by minority populations. More important for this article is that the deﬁnition
of the groups follows the same lines in both points in time and less whether
the chosen group characterization is the correct one. Despite the critique on
the ANM data, comparing them with the two main alternatives, Alesina et al.
(2003) and Fearon (2003) yields high correlations as displayed in Table 132:
Additionally, one might argue that the data has been assembled under the
auspices of the Soviet Union with a signiﬁcant bias between Eastern and West-
31As both are published in Russian only, this article relies on Roeder (2001), who calculated
and published ELF values based on these two editions. Roeder (2001), additionally, calculates
ELF values in three diﬀerent ways, depending on the aggregation levels of sub-groups reported
in the original data. Following the approach of Alesina et al. (2003), this analysis is based on
the most disaggregated values that use all sub-groups reported.
32For their ELF indices both combine diﬀerent sources, mainly the CIA Factbook (CIA,
2009) and the Encyclopædia Britannica (2009). Whereas Alesina et al. (2003) pursue to
always select the most granular source, Fearon (2003) limits the data on groups that at least
constitute 1% of a country’s population. Due to the very subjective decisions between the
data sources selected, both measures also have some severe limitations.
14ANM ’61 ANM ’85 Alesina Fearon
ANM ’61 1
ANM ’85 0.9517 1
Alesina 0.8473 0.7850 1
Fearon 0.8147 0.8430 0.8628 1
Table 1: Pairwise correlation of main ELF indices
ern countries. Taylor and Hudson (1972) tested for this point right from the
beginning but did not ﬁnd any hint for this theory. Finally, Weidmann et al.
(2010) conclude that the ANM data ‘‘is complete and carefully researched, it
relies on a uniform group list that is valid across state borders.’’ The last point
is probably the most important for my analysis.
Based on the sources used to calculate the ELF values, Roeder (2001) re-
ports the data to be for the years 1961 and 1985. As yearly data on most of the
covariates used to explain ethnic heterogeneity and its trends is scarcely avail-
able, average values for 1960—65 for the ﬁrst point in time and for 1975—80
for the second are used33. An important reason to take the average of several
years instead of single ones is to avoid or at least reduce the impact of cyclical
deviations. Additionally, the focus of this paper is on a longer time frame and
not on annual variations. For the later time span one could alternatively use
1980—85 instead of 1975—80. The period from 1975—80 is preferable for two
reasons. First, if diversity adjusts in reaction to policy changes, as is argued in
this paper, it needs time to adapt and will not change immediately. Taking a
lag of ﬁve years, gives some room for these adjustments34. Second, time having
elapsed between changes in policy variables and the ELF adaptations, limits
the suspicions of reverse causality that ELF changes are responsible for policy
adjustments.
Roeder (2001) reports data for 138 countries at both points in time based
on the respective edition of the Atlas Narodov Mira35. Table 2 displays the
distribution of ELF values across regions for both years. The highest median
level is found, as expected, in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) and the lowest in
Western countries36. This picture is consistent in both years. The same is
33In the early 1960s, data is often only available in ﬁve-year spans. Taking six-year averages
increases the data availability for many countries for the ﬁrst point in time.
34Analyzing the adjustment times between policy changes and ELF value changes, which
might diﬀer considerably between variables, exhibits an interesting area for future research.
35In total data is reported for 151 countries for the two points in time. However, some
(former) countries where no additional data was available and countries that changed con-
siderably over the time due to secession (e.g. Pakistan/Bangladesh) or union (e.g. Vietnam)
were excluded.
36This includes besides the European Countries also developed nations like Australia,
Canada, Japan, New Zealand and the United States. Categorization is taken from Fearon
(2003).
15ANM 1961 ANM 1985 Delta (’85-’61)
Region Obs. Mean Std.D. Obs. Mean Std.D. Obs. Mean Std.D.
World 138 0.463 0.278 168 0.461 0.272 138 0.006 0.086
Asia 22 0.483 0.295 27 0.467 0.306 22 -0.035 0.053
E. Europe 5 0.138 0.094 26 0.371 0.207 5 -0.029 0.038
L. America 25 0.446 0.194 26 0.443 0.213 25 0.012 0.061
MENA 19 0.318 0.165 20 0.342 0.222 19 0.040 0.177
SSA 45 0.674 0.226 46 0.663 0.235 45 -0.011 0.037
W. Countries 22 0.231 0.210 23 0.273 0.227 22 0.050 0.076
Table 2: Summary statistics of Atlas Narodov Mira data for 1961, 1985 and its
change between 1961 and 1985
true for intermediate ELF values for Asia, Latin America and the Middle East
and North Africa (MENA). The huge change of ELF values in Eastern Europe
between the 1961 values and the 1985 values comes entirely from an increase in
observation from ﬁve countries in 1961 to 26 in 1985.
Regions that became more homogeneous (a decreasing ELF value) show neg-
ative values, whereas regions that became more heterogeneous (an increasing
ELF value) show positive values. Although the median country per region did
not change much, all except for 19 countries report a change in their respective
ELF value. The biggest changes were experienced in the MENA region, where
countries moved signiﬁcantly in both directions. Nevertheless, some tendencies
of regional drift can be noted. Whereas Asia experienced rather a homogeniza-
tion, Latin America and the Western countries showed some heterogenization.
Sub-Saharan Africa did not experience much variation over the 20 years in
question.
5 Results
5.1 Inﬂuential factors on a ‘base-level’ of diversity
The regressions of Table 4 are based on equation (2) and includes the major
geographical variables already discussed. Latitude reﬂects the distance from
the equator, Altitude measures the altitude variation that is found within a
country, and Area is its surface area. The more distant a country is located
from the equator, we would expect a decreasing biodiversity and in turn also
a lower ethnic diversity. Latitude has the expected negative sign and is highly
signiﬁcant. Larger and more mountainous countries have a higher probability
to encompass diﬀerent habitats. This opens more solitary areas that facilitate
the development of diﬀerent species and ethnic groups and additionally acts
16as barrier to sustain them. Both Altitude and Area show a signiﬁcant positive
impact on higher diversity levels.
The fourth variable included in the ﬁrst regression is Agritime. It captures
the time elapsed since the transition from a hunter-gatherer economy to agri-
cultural production. The earliest countries transitioned around 8500 B.C. and
the latest only around 1600 A.D.37. Countries that made the transition ear-
lier in time should then show a lower level of diversity as they had more time
to develop into more advanced civilizations. As expected, Agritime displays a
negative sign that is signiﬁcant at the 5% level. The diﬀerent transition times
between the ﬁrst and the last countries (approx. 10.000 years) lead to 0.16
lower ELF values.
In regression (2), another variable used by Ahlerup and Olsson (2007) is
included. The experience of a modern state captures how many years in the
time between 1800 and 1950 a country had power over its territory. It has a
comparable interpretation as Agritime but in a way captures the ﬁnal result or
how well an early civilizations developed into modern civilizations. Therefore,
it comes as no surprise that both variables point in the same direction. As
soon as Modern is included it remains signiﬁcant whereas Agritime loses its
signiﬁcance.
Regression (3) controls for more speciﬁc geographical characteristics, includ-
ing a Tropics variable and regional dummies. The Tropics variable measures
the percentage of a country’s total areas classiﬁed as being exposed to trop-
ical climate. As expected, one ﬁnds a positive and signiﬁcant correlation be-
tween tropical climate and diversity. Except for the Sub-Saharan Africa dummy,
which is marginally signiﬁcant, none of the other regional dummies is signiﬁ-
cant. Latitude, which was highly signiﬁcant in all previous regressions, loses its
signiﬁcant explanatory power when the regional dummies are included. This is
not too surprising as the regional division partly reﬂects the distance from the
equator. Additionally, Tropics seem to better capture the idea of a diﬀerent
habitat around the equator. Nevertheless, the major geographical variables Al-
titude and Area rather maintain their signiﬁcance. Thus, latitude per se is not
the driver of a diﬀerent diversity structure but the diﬀerent geographical and
climatic conditions found along the latitudinal stretch.
More democratic regimes are considered to give their citizens more freedom
of personal expression and might thus also show a higher level of diversity.
Democratic tradition is measured by the average Polity score after World War
37The ﬁrst were Israel, Jordan, Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic, whereas Mauritius
and Australia were the last.
17II (1945—1960)38 developed by Marshall and Jaggers (2008). Democratic Tra-
dition displays the expected positive sign at least at the 10% level39.
Regressions (5)-(8) of Table 4 replicate the ﬁrst four regressions for the sec-
ond ANM data set of the 1980s. As the covariates did not change between the
two points in time, there should not be a diﬀerent result in taking the later
one. As expected, there is no qualitative diﬀerence between the two data sets
and the results remain very much comparable40. All results so far are in line
with the results of Ahlerup and Olsson (2007) and Michalopoulos (2008). As
these authors test their hypotheses not on the ANM data but on the ELF in-
dices from Alesina et al. (2003) and Fearon (2003), regression (1) and (2) from
Table 4 are replicated for both alternative sources. The results are reported in
Table 5 and generally support all ﬁndings, discussed so far. These results give
additional credibility to the ANM data.
Exceeding the scope of Ahlerup and Olsson (2007) and Michalopoulos (2008),
this article investigates further on the grounds of colonization. Table 6 shows
the main results41. Regression (1) is the already known set-up for the full set
of countries. In regression (2), a Colony dummy is included to control if former
colonies generally show diﬀerences in their diversity set-up from non colonial
countries. Former colonies seem to display signiﬁcantly lower levels of diversity.
Not only the statistic signiﬁcance but also the economic one is big. Former
colonies are attributed with an around 21% lower level of diversity. This result
could be driven by the linguistic bias of the diversity data. Especially in Latin
America, the colonial regime rather left a common language. Regression (3)
tries to prove this by entering interaction terms of the colony and the regional
dummies for Latin America and Sub Saharan Africa. Although they have the
expected sign, Latin America negative and Sub-Saharan Africa positive, both
38Alesina and Zhuravskaya (2011) use a comparable time frame to assess a democratic
tradition variable. Additionally, Campos and Kuzeyev (2007) also found signiﬁcant changes
in the ethnic set-up over a short time frame of 13 years after the fall of the Iron curtain.
However, if the time frame for the Democratic Tradition variable is extended to 1900–1960,
the results do not change, but the observations are further reduced.
39A caveat is that the inclusion of the Democratic Tradition variable nearly halves the
number of observations. That is also why these variables in coming regressions are not included
unless explicitly controlled for the role of democracy.
40In an additional regression GDP/capita levels in 1960 were included in the regressions of
Table 4. Whereas the GDP/capita levels in 1960 had only a signiﬁcant inﬂuence in less than
halve of the regressions, Latitude, Area, Modern and the MENA and the SSA dummy retained
their signiﬁcance or improved. Altitude, Agritime and Democratic tradition lost signiﬁcance.
As the number of observation is again signiﬁcantly reduced, these results are not explicitly
reported here.
41In the following regressions the 1985 ANM data is used as it contains more observations
than the earlier version. However, the results do not change compared to the earlier data.
18are not signiﬁcant. The result of the Colony variable is not altered very much42.
The longer the colonial powers stayed the more settlers might have domicili-
ated in the new countries permanently. Aligned with earlier ﬁndings of Ahlerup
and Olsson (2007), the colonial duration (Duration) has a positive, but barely
signiﬁcant, impact on diversity displayed in regression (4). Controlling in re-
gression (5) for the colonizer’s homeland, one ﬁnds no signiﬁcant correlation
with the French, Spanish or British colonizers.
In regression (6) and (7), the idea of Acemoglu et al. (2001) was picked up,
exploring the implication how, rather than by whom countries were colonized.
In countries with high mortality rates, colonial powers did not show any interest
in establishing permanent settlements. This ‘divide-and-rule’ approach should
have left its mark in the form of higher diversity levels. Ethnic diﬀerences were
often leveraged to play groups oﬀ against each other. Building on prevalent
tensions, lead to the emergence and a segmenting of groups along group lines.
Indeed, Mortality shows a signiﬁcant positive correlation with the level of di-
versity43. Including the Mortality estimate also aﬀects the colonizer homeland
dummies, rendering the British dummy signiﬁcant. This is very much in line
how Bolt and Bezemer (2009) describe the educational system in the British
colonies. Whereas the French colonizers pursued an approach of assimilation
and introduced a centrally controlled system, the British colonizers pursued a
more indirect inﬂuence. They exercised a rule, ‘‘where traditional structures
and institutions were left intact’’ and acted with a ‘‘relative tolerance towards
local customs’’ (Bolt and Bezemer, 2009, p. 30)
Analyzing the inﬂuence of evolutionary and historical factors, two impor-
tant insights turned out. Earlier ﬁndings with diﬀerent data sets, showing that
geographical attributes (especially Altitude, Area and Latitude) are highly re-
sponsible for the ‘base level’ of diversity, are conﬁrmed. Second, attention is
drawn to the role of colonization. This article argues that the homeland of the
colonizers is less important for a former colony’s diversity than how colonial
powers pursued their endeavors.
5.2 Drivers of diversity level changes over a short period
Table 7 reports the ﬁrst results of the regressions based on equation (3). It con-
tains all variables that display a change over the period covered, i.e., variables
42An additional caveat is that it is hard to distinguish whether the eﬀect does not reﬂect
a reverse causality and colonial powers just chose more homogeneous countries for their colo-
nization eﬀorts.
43Including the mortality variable, increases the explanatory power of the model, increasing
the adjusted R
2 from 0.39 to 0.52 between regression (1) and (5). However, the number of
observations decreased again signiﬁcantly.
19of the vector ∆Xi. Latitude, Altitude, Area, Agritime and the ANM values in
1961 are included as static variables of vector Zi. Although the variables of
vector Zi do not show any changes over time, they might have a mediating role
for diversity adaptations. This is why they are controlled for in all regressions
in this table. However, nearly none of the variables are signiﬁcant, and the
values are not explicitly reported here.
As discussed earlier, data availability poses a major limitation to the regres-
sions. This article tries to make the best possible trade-oﬀ between including
additional variables and thereby reducing the risk of omitted variables by not
too much downsizing the number of observations available.
Regression (1) controls for the most important changes in developing coun-
tries regarding their settlement and population pattern. Metropolitan areas
attract people from the countryside with the prospect of a better economic fu-
ture. Many old traditions are left behind, and one tries to merge into a more
mainstream culture of major cities. Indeed, a signiﬁcant negative impact of
the change in Urbanization, the percentage of the population living in urban
areas, on the diversity level is found. As expected, the most obvious eﬀect
of Immigration on heterogeneity is positive. Both are signiﬁcant at the 5%
level. Comparing both eﬀects, immigration plays a bigger role. An increase in
one standard deviation of immigration change increases the diversity change by
0.45 standard deviations, whereas the same change in urbanization leads to a
decrease of -0.19 standard deviations. Population density (Density) shows no
signiﬁcant impact in this ﬁrst regression.
In regression (2), primary schooling rates (Primary Schooling) are included.
This variable does not only cover the educational attainment and in a way the
level of education in a country but can be understood as a proxy for state in-
ﬂuence on an increasing part of the population. Primary Schooling seems to
be a very important variable. It shows a signiﬁcant negative impact and lowers
the size and signiﬁcance level of both, Urbanization and Immigration. Primary
Schooling and Immigration display the highest impact with beta-coeﬃcients of
-0.26 and 0.41, respectively. Controlling for various other variables in regres-
sions (3)-(6), the signiﬁcant inﬂuence of Urbanization, Immigration and Pri-
mary Schooling persists at least at the 5% level. Neither a change in the level
of democracy (Polity IV), the number of conﬂicts (Conﬂicts) nor Trade and
Infrastructure (Telephones) show any signiﬁcant impact. Including changes in
GDP per capita levels (GDP/capita) in regression (7), turns all variables except
for Primary Schooling and Urbanization insigniﬁcant. Although the variable
carries the expected negative sign, it is per se insigniﬁcant. Most of the socioe-
20conomic policy variables are very strongly associated with higher wealth levels
of a country, reﬂected in growing GDP/capita levels. That Primary School-
ing and Urbanization remain signiﬁcant, although the GDP/capita increase is
included, conﬁrm their robustness. Regression (7) is also the only one where
Immigration loses its signiﬁcance. As immigrants are attracted by prosperous
countries, i.e., countries with high GDP/capita growth rates, a high correlation
with immigration is inevitable. Controlling for regions (8)), does not add any
new insights as all of these variables are not signiﬁcant. They also do not lead
to any major changes in the variables focussed here.
As was already pointed out in the discussion of the economic and policy
factors, it is hard to see why GDP/capita levels should have a direct impact
on diversity. The regressions in Table 7 already showed some inﬂuential fac-
tors that all are highly linked to the GDP/capita levels and the progress, the
GDP/capita growth rates. However, as the overall economic development of a
country plays a crucial role, it is also controlled for it here. This is done less in
order to generate new insights than as an additional robustness check. Taking
selected regressions of Table 7 in Table 8 various measures of (economic) devel-
opment are included. Regressions (1) and (2) are the already known ones. In
regression (3) and (4), additionally the GDP/capita level in 1960 based on the
Penn World Tables (Heston et al., 2009) is included in the otherwise unchanged
set-up44. Urbanization and Immigration that show the highest correlation with
the GDP/capita level turns insigniﬁcant. Instead the GDP/capita level at the
beginning of the period is positive in all regressions at least at the 5% level.
Primary Schooling shows lower, but still signiﬁcant values if GDP/capita levels
are included. If the GDP growth (change in GDP/capita levels) are included
the signiﬁcance fades. This has two important interpretations. First, the results
for Primary Schooling are robust. Although the GDP/capita level variable ab-
sorbs some of its inﬂuencing value, its signiﬁcance does not change considerably.
Countries that are richer already have much higher primary schooling ﬁgures,
so changes would be expected to be smaller. Still the inﬂuence persists. Second,
countries that already have a higher development level seem already to move
in the other direction, thus getting more heterogeneous. Most of the highly
developed countries are classic immigration countries, like the US, Australia
and Canada. That hints to the curvilinear relationship of ethnic identiﬁcation
and development or ‘modernization’ discussed in Bannon et al. (2004). Ethnic
fragmentation is not necessarily a sign of backwardness.
44The results displayed are based on the Laspeyres index of the Penn World Tables. The
regressions with the Chain index yield the same results.
21Regressions (5) and (6) use HDI numbers (UNDP - United Nations De-
velopment Programme, 1994). The Human Development Indicator (HDI) is a
broader indicator of development, not only taking into account the GDP/capita
levels but also health and education ﬁgures. In general, the results are very
much comparable to the results discussed above. The broader construction of
the HDI, especially including schooling variables, explains why the HDI variable
is the only one where also the change variable has a signiﬁcant and negative
impact, taking up the inﬂuence of the Primary Schooling variable.
As additional robustness checks, the key regressions of Table 7 are run again
with diﬀerent model speciﬁcations. Both ﬁxed-eﬀect (FE) and the random-
eﬀect (RE) models are tested. Using the FE model, a correlation between the
entity speciﬁc error term and the explanatory variables is allowed. Furthermore,
all level variables that are time-invariant are removed from the regressions to
assess only the regressors’ net eﬀect. The inﬂuence of the time-invariant charac-
teristics that were also controlled in the earlier regression would thus be covered
in the error terms. The RE model, in contrast, assumes the independence be-
tween the entity error term and the explanatory variables. From the discussion
above, the better suitability of the FE model is clear. However, the Hausman-
test only supports in half of the regression pairs clearly the FE model45. Table
9 summarizes the results of both models. Although the values of the coeﬃcients
vary, the signiﬁcant positive or negative eﬀects of the main variables Urbaniza-
tion, Immigration and Primary Schooling are clearly conﬁrmed.
Because Primary Schooling seems to play a crucial role, Table 10 depicts
the inﬂuence of diﬀerent measures of education as well as various education
levels to test the robustness of the ﬁnding. Regression (1) corresponds to the
second regression in Table 7. Immigration and Primary Schooling are both
signiﬁcant46. In regression (2), additionally Secondary Schooling and Tertiary
Schooling are included. The coeﬃcient of Primary Schooling remains signiﬁ-
cant and increases in size. Looking at the role of higher education, reveals an
additional interesting insight. Secondary Schooling enters the regression with
a signiﬁcant positive sign. Higher education apparently has a diﬀerent eﬀect
on diversity than primary education. While the eﬀect of primary education
is uniformly negative, secondary education enters mostly positively into the
45This is the case for the regression pairs (2/6) and (3/7). Results of the Hausman test are
not reported here.
46As in the previous regression, controls for Latitude, Altitude, Area, Agritime and the ELF
‘base-level’ in 1961 (ANM ’61) are included in the regressions; details on the results are not
explicitly reported here.
22equations47.
Regressions (3)-(7) try to fundament the ﬁndings with diﬀerent measures
of education oﬀered by Barro and Lee (2010). The total sum of all years of
schooling (Schooling total) does not show any signiﬁcant impact. This is not
surprising. As primary and higher educational levels enter the regression with
opposite signs, they seem to cancel out if summed up together. All other regres-
sions conﬁrm the homogenizing impact of primary education. In most cases,
the positive impact of higher education is also conﬁrmed. However, the coef-
ﬁcients are no more signiﬁcant. These robustness checks conﬁrm the apparent
importance of primary schooling for a country’s homogenization and does not
depend on the deﬁnition or measure of primary education.
In section 4, the time frame chosen was already discussed. For the reason
of endogeneity and time needed for potential adjustments of diversity, the time
frame 1960/65—1975/80 was chosen. Nevertheless, the results should not en-
tirely depend on the choice of the time frame. As an additional robustness check,
the time frame for all policy variables was changed from 1960/65—1975/80 to
1960/65—1980/85. The results are reported in Table 11. Although the coef-
ﬁcient sizes vary slightly, the signiﬁcance levels of all variables discussed only
change marginally.
6 Conclusion
In line with the recent publications of Ahlerup and Olsson (2007) and Michalopou-
los (2008) on the roots of ethnically diverse countries, the major results are
conﬁrmed. Although diﬀerent data and data sources were partly used, the re-
sults remain robust. Geographical characteristics, like a country’s surface and
altitude variation, and evolutionary factors, like the transition from sedentary
farming, are major drivers of a ‘base-level’ of ethnic fragmentation. To the
analysis of geographical and historical factors a more detailed view on colo-
nization is added. Whereas the homeland of the colonizer seem to play no
important role, the way how a country was colonized does show a signiﬁcant
impact. Countries, where colonial powers did not have any incentive to settle
and build good institutions but rather exploited the country’s resources, show
a signiﬁcant higher level of ethnic fragmentation. Ethnic boundaries seemed to
47Knack and Keefer (1997) ﬁnd in their analysis of education’s role on trust a comparable
diﬀerentiated result for primary and secondary education. Additionally, Bannon et al. (2004)
comparably ﬁnd in their analysis of ethnic identiﬁcation for a small set of African states that
students identify themselves more along ethnic lines than farmers.
23be an easy line for playing one group oﬀ against the other. Mistrust and rifts
between ethnic groups seem to persist also after independence — mirrored in
higher fragmentation levels.
What this paper mainly wants to add to the recent discussion, is that eth-
nic fragmentation can not be treated as being exogenous or being only rooted
in geographic and historical factors. Especially since the beginning of the 20th
century, various policy and economic factors signiﬁcantly changed the dynamics
between ethnic groups, their interchange and assimilation, as well as migration
patterns. Migration proves to be the most important factor in changing a coun-
try’s diversity. Gulf countries, relying heavily on immigrants, show this trend
most clearly. Doubtless, migration plays an even bigger role in the globalized
world subsequently the time frame analyzed in this paper. Its impact might
thus be even more pronounced today. The same is true for the other variables
shown to have a signiﬁcant impact on a country’s ethnic fragmentation. Other
more policy-induced variables, like urbanization and especially primary educa-
tion, leave their marks on a country’s diversity. Urbanization and the growth of
metropolitan areas, attracting huge parts of the population, lead to an erosion
of old habits and to an assimilation into or the emergence of a ‘mainstream’
culture. Education is, according to the ﬁndings of this paper, not only a mea-
sure of a higher educational level attained. Because primary education is in
general the ﬁrst contact point with the state authorities, it is also a good proxy
for the government’s inﬂuence. By expanding the government’s reach for more
remote areas and in turn by increasing the primary education numbers, more
and more people are exposed to its inﬂuence. In line with recent ﬁndings of
other authors, education is not inﬂuencing diversity uniformly. The empirical
results support the theoretical ﬁndings that higher educational levels lead to a
more heterogeneous society.
Nevertheless, the paper also faces some limitations. Due to data limitation
in the early 1960s, not all of the variables discussed can be tested. Only data on
ethno-linguistic fragmentation and not on other concepts regarding language or
religion was available. In line with Campos and Kuzeyev (2007), the distinction
between ethnic, linguistic and religious diversity could be an interesting ﬁeld for
future research. Not only that these diﬀerent characteristics might be driven
by diﬀerent factors, the time span in which changes occur and the direction
might also be diﬀerent. Additionally, the changes may be less visible due to
the highly linguistic deﬁnition of the ANM data. Both Campos and Kuzeyev
(2007) and Fedderke and Luiz (2007) ﬁnd more signiﬁcant changes in ethnic
and racial set-up than for the linguistic and religious characteristics.
24Despite these limitations, the set of variables and data used for this article
show clear and very robust results. They are a very good basis to refute the
assumption of diversity’s exogeneity. Thus, this paper is not only a caveat for
the interpretation of most of the current studies to be aware of these changes,
but it also marks a ﬁrst assessment of what might be the drivers of these
changes.
Admitting that a country’s ethnic set-up changes and that it can be inﬂu-
enced, turns back to the growing literature on the eﬀects of ethnic diversity.
Having seen that the ethnic composition is changing with variables that are
highly linked to the development level of a country, using a ﬁxed measure of
ethnicity for economic growth analysis seems rather unreasonable. This would
attach greater importance to older measures of the ex ante ethno-linguistic com-
position of a country in the analysis of economic outcomes, because the ethnic
set-up may have been endogenously determined by the factors under investi-
gation. This is exactly what Campos and Kuzeyev (2007) ﬁnd for their data
set on former Soviet Republics. Whereas the eﬀect of an exogenous diversity
measure on growth is limited, the dynamic, endogenous measure illustrates a
signiﬁcantly negative eﬀect.
More than a caveat, this article oﬀers a ﬁrst attempt to venture into the
dynamics of diversity and gives some better understanding as to how policy,
intentionally or not, can shape a country’s ethnic set-up.
25References
Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S. and Robinson, J. A. (2001) The Colonial Origins of
Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation, American Economic
Review, 91, 1369–1401.
Ahlerup, P. and Olsson, O. (2007) The Roots of Ethnic Diversity, Working
Papers in Economics 281, Department of Economics, G¨ oteborg University.
Akdede, S. H. (2010) Do more Ethnically and Religiously Diverse Countries
have Lower Democratization?, Economics Letters, 106, 101–104.
Alesina, A., Devleeschauwer, A., Easterly, W., Kurlat, S. and Wacziarg, R.
(2003) Fractionalization, Journal of Economic Growth, 8, 155–194.
Alesina, A. and La Ferrara, E. (2005) Ethnic Diversity and Economic Perfor-
mance, Journal of Economic Literature, 43, 762–800.
Alesina, A. and Zhuravskaya, E. (2011) Segregation and the Quality of Govern-
ment in a Cross-Section of Countries, American Economic Review, p. forth-
coming.
Bannon, A., Miguel, E. and Posner, D. N. (2004) Sources of Ethnic Identiﬁca-
tion in Africa, Afrobarometer Working Papers 44, Afrobarometer.
Barro, R. J. (1999) Determinants of Democracy, The Journal of Political Econ-
omy, 107, 158–183.
Barro, R. J. and Lee, J.-W. (2010) A New Data Set of Educational Attainment
in the World, 1950-2010, NBER Working Papers 15902, National Bureau of
Economic Research.
Barro, R. J. and McCleary, R. (2003) Religion and Economic Growth, NBER
Working Papers 9682, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Bates, R. H. (2006) Ethnicity, in The Elgar Companion to Development Studies
(Ed.) D. A. Clark, Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham, pp. 167–173.
Bellini, E., Ottaviano, G. I. P., Pinelli, D. and Prarolo, G. (2009) Cultural Di-
versity and Economic Performance: Evidence from European Regions, Work-
ing Papers 2009.63, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
Bezemer, D. J. and Jong-A-Pin, R. (2008) World on Fire? Democracy, Global-
ization and Ethnic Violence, MPRA Paper 7027, University Library of Mu-
nich.
Bisin, A. and Verdier, T. (2001) The Economics of Cultural Transmission and
the Dynamics of Preferences, Journal of Economic Theory, 97, 298–319.
Bolt, J. and Bezemer, D. (2009) Understanding Long-Run African Growth:
Colonial Institutions or Colonial Education?, The Journal of Development
Studies, 45, 24–54.
26Bruk, S. I. (1964) Atlas Narodov Mira, N. N. Miklucho-Maklaja, Moskva, In-
stitut Etnograﬁi Imeni.
Bruk, S. I. and Puˇ ckov, P. I. (1986) Naselenie Mira, Nauka, Moskva, 2 edn.,
Etnodemograﬁˇ ceskij Spravoˇ cnik.
Campos, N. F. and Kuzeyev, V. S. (2007) On the Dynamics of Ethnic Frac-
tionalization, IZA Discussion Papers 2822, Institute for the Study of Labor.
Caselli, F. and Coleman, W. J. (2008) On the Theory of Ethnic Conﬂict, CEDI
Discussion Paper Series 08-08, Centre for Economic Development and Insti-
tutions, Brunel University West London.
Cashdan, E. (2001) Ethnic Diversity and its Environmental Determinants: Ef-
fects of Climate, Pathogens, and Habitat Diversity, American Anthropologist,
103, 968–991.
CIA (2009) The World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/
publications/the-world-factbook/.
Coleman, D. (2009) Divergent Patterns in the Ethnic Transformation of Soci-
eties, Population and Development Review, 35, 449–478.
Collier, P. (1998) The Political Economy of Ethnicity, Working Paper Series
98-8, Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford.
Collier, P. (2000) Ethnicity, Politics and Economic Performance, Economics
and Politics, 12, 225–245.
Collier, P. and Hoeﬄer, A. (1998) On Economic Causes of Civil War, Oxford
Economic Papers, 50, 563–573.
Constant, A. and Zimmermann, K. F. (2007) Measuring Ethnic Identity and
Its Impact on Economic Behavior, IZA Discussion Papers 3063, Institute for
the Study of Labor.
Darity, W. A., JR., Mason, P. L. and Stewart, J. B. (2006) The Economics of
Identity: The Origin and Persistence of Racial Identity Norms, Journal of
Economic Behavior and Organization, 60, 283–305.
Dreher, A. (2006) Does Globalization Aﬀect Growth? Evidence from a New
Index of Globalization, Applied Economics, 38, 1091–1110.
Easterly, W. and Levine, R. (1997) Africa’s Growth Tragedy: Policies and
Ethnic Divisions, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112, 1203–1250.
Encyclopædia Britannica (Ed.) (2009) The New Encyclopædia Britannica, En-
cyclopædia Britannica Inc., Chicago, Ill., 15. ed. edn.
Eriksen, T. H. (1991) Ethnicity versus Nationalism, Journal of Peace Research,
28, 263–278.
27European Commission (2006) Turkey 2006 Progress Report, Commission staﬀ
working document – SEC(2006) 1390, Brussels.
Fearon, J. D. (2003) Ethnic and Cultural Diversity by Country, Journal of
Economic Growth, 8, 195–222.
Fearon, J. D. and Laitin, D. D. (1999) Weak States, Rough Terrain, and Large-
scale Ethnic Violence since 1945, Atlanta, Ga., Presented at the Annual
Meeting of the American Political Science Association.
Fearon, J. D. and Laitin, D. D. (2000) Violence and the Social Construction of
Ethnic Identity, International Organization, 54, 845–877.
Fedderke, J., Luiz, J. and de Kadt, R. (2008) Using Fractionalization Indexes:
Deriving Methodological Principles for Growth Studies from Time Series Ev-
idence, Social Indicators Research, 85, 257–278.
Fedderke, J. W. and Luiz, J. M. (2007) Fractionalization and Long-run Eco-
nomic Growth: Webs and Direction of Association Between the Economic
and the Social: South Africa as a Time Series Case Study, Applied Economics,
39, 1037–1052.
Fernandez, R. and Fogli, A. (2009) Culture: An Empirical Investigation of
Beliefs, Work, and Fertility, American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics,
1, 146–177.
G-Econ (2006) Geographically Based Economic Data 1.3, http://gecon.yale.
edu/.
Garcia-Montalvo, J. and Reynal-Querol, M. (2003) Religious Polarization and
Economic Development, Economics Letters, 80, 201–210.
Garcia-Montalvo, J. and Reynal-Querol, M. (2005) Ethnic Diversity and Eco-
nomic Development, Journal of Development Economics, 76, 293–323.
Garcia-Montalvo, J. and Reynal-Querol, M. (2008) Discrete Polarisation with
an Application to the Determinants of Genocides, The Economic Journal,
118, 1835–1865.
Gellner, E. (1983) Nations and Nationalism, Cornell University Press, Ithaca,
1 edn.
Gleditsch, N. P., Wallensteen, P., Eriksson, M., Sollenberg, M. and Strand,
H. (2002) Armed Conﬂict 1946-2001: A New Dataset, Journal of Peace Re-
search, 39, 615–637.
Greif, A. (1993) Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early
Trade: The Maghribi Traders’ Coalition, The American Economic Review,
83, 525–548.
Guiso, L., Sapienza, P. and Zingales, L. (2004) Cultural Biases in Economic
Exchange, NBER Working Papers 11005, National Bureau of Economic Re-
search.
28H´ eran, F., Filhon, A. and Deprez, C. (2002) La dynamique des langues en
France au ﬁl du XXe si` ecle, Bulletin mensuel d’information 376, L’institut
national d’´ etudes d´ emographiques.
Heston, A., Summers, R. and Aten, B. (2009) Penn World Table Version 6.3,
Data Set, Center for International Comparisons of Production, Income and
Prices, University of Pennsylvania.
Horowitz, D. L. (1985) Ethnic Groups in Conﬂict, University of California Press,
Berkeley, Calif.
Janeba, E. (2004) International Trade and Cultural Identity, NBER Working
Papers 10426, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Knack, S. and Keefer, P. (1997) Does Social Capital Have an Economic Payoﬀ?
A Cross-Country Investigation, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112,
1251–1288.
Kolo, P. (2011a) Measuring a New Aspect of Ethnicity – Construction of an
Appropriate Diversity Index, mimeo, Georg-August University Goettingen.
Kolo, P. (2011b) On the Dynamics of Ethnicity, mimeo, Georg-August Univer-
sity Goettingen.
Lazear, E. P. (1999) Culture and Language, The Journal of Political Economy,
107, 95–126.
Leeson, P. T. (2005) Endogenizing Fractionalization, Journal of Institutional
Economics, 1, 75–98.
Lewis, M. P. (2009) Ethnologue; Languages of the World, Summer Institute of
Linguistics (SIL), Dallas, Tex., 16 edn.
Limao, N. and Venables, A. J. (2001) Infrastructure, Geographical Disadvan-
tage, Transport Costs, and Trade, World Bank Economic Review, 15, 451–
479.
Marshall, M. G. and Jaggers, K. (2008) Political Regime Characteristics and
Transitions, 1800-2008: Polity IV Project, http://www.systemicpeace.
org/polity/polity4.htm.
Mauro, P. (1995) Corruption and Growth, The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
110, 681–712.
Michalopoulos, S. (2008) The Origins of Ethnolinguistic Diversity: Theory and
Evidence, MPRA Paper 11531, University Library of Munich.
Olsson, O. (2007) On the Institutional Legacy of Mercantilist and Imperialist
Colonialism, Working Papers in Economics 247, Department of Economics,
G¨ oteborg University.
Olsson, O. and Hibbs, D. A. (2005) Biogeography and Long-Run Economic
Development, European Economic Review, 49, 909–938.
29Perez, A. D. and Hirschman, C. (2009) The Changing Racial and Ethnic Com-
position of the US Population: Emerging American Identities, Population
and Development Review, 35, 1–51.
Posner, D. N. (2004) Measuring Ethnic Fractionalization in Africa, American
Journal of Political Science, 48, 849–863.
Putterman, L. (2008) State Antiquity Index, http://www.econ.brown.edu/
fac/Louis_Puttermann.
Putterman, L. and Weil, D. N. (2010) Post-1500 Population Flows and the
Long-Run Determinants of Economic Growth and Inequality, The Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 125, 1627–1682.
Ranis, G. (2009) Diversity of Communities and Economic Development: An
Overview, Center Discussion Paper 977, Economic Growth Center, Yale Uni-
versity.
Roeder, P. G. (2001) Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization (ELF) Indices, 1961 and
1985, http://weber.ucsd.edu/~proeder/elf.htm.
Sachs, J. D. (2001) Tropical Underdevelopment, NBER Working Papers 8119,
National Bureau of Economic Research.
Saez-Marti, M. and Sj¨ ogren, A. (2007) Peers and Culture, Working Paper Series
349, Institute for Empirical Research Economics, University of Zurich.
Sch¨ uler, D. and Weisbrod, J. (2010) Ethnic Fractionalisation, Migration and
Growth, Empirical Economics, 39, 457–486.
Spolaore, E. and Wacziarg, R. (2009) The Diﬀusion of Development, The Quar-
terly Journal of Economics, 124, 469–529.
Taylor, C. L. and Hudson, M. C. (1972) World Handbook of Political and Social
Indicators, Yale University Press, New Haven.
UNDP - United Nations Development Programme (1994) Human Development
Report 1994, Oxford University Press, New York.
van den Berghe, P. L. (1981) The Ethnic Phenomenon, Elsevier, New York.
Weber, E. (1976) Peasants into Frenchmen; the Modernization of Rural France,
1870-1914, Stanford University Press, Stanford, Calif.
Weidmann, N. B., Rød, J. K. and Cederman, L.-E. (2010) Representing Ethnic
Groups in Space: A New Dataset, Journal of Peace Research, 47, 491–499.
World Bank (2009) World Development Indicators 2009: CD-ROM and Book,
The World Bank Group, Washington, DC.
30A Appendix
31Table 3: Overview of variables, deﬁnitions and sources
Variable name Description Source
ANM Atlas Narodov Mira (ANM) Ethno-linguistic fractionalization
index (ELF)
Roeder (2001)
Alesina Ethno-linguistic fractionalization index (ELF) of Alesina Alesina et al. (2003)
Fearon Ethno-linguistic fractionalization index (ELF) of Fearon Fearon (2003)
Latitude Absolute value of the latitude of a country’s capital, scaled to
take values between 0 and 1, where 0 is the equator
Cepii (2011)
Altitude Average absolute deviation between grid and country mean al-
titude
Based on G-Econ (2006)
Area Log of country area in km2 World Bank (2009)
Agritime Years since transition to agriculture (in ’000 years) in relation
to the base year 2000
Putterman (2008)
Modern State power over territory between 1800 and 1950 in years
∗ Putterman and Weil (2010)
Democratic
tradition
Average polity2 score (ranging from -10 to 10), with lower val-
ues indicating a less democratic or autocratic regimes (negative
values) for the years after WWII 1945—1960. Only countries
with observation for at least half of the years included
Marshall and Jaggers (2008)





Dummy for Eastern Europe, Latin America, North Africa and
Middle East, Sub-Saharan Africa, Western countries and Asia
Based on Fearon (2003)
Colony Dummy variable that takes value one if country was colonized
and 0 if not
Based on data in Olsson
(2007)





Dummy variable for Spanish, French, British or Portuguese col-
onization of the country
Cepii (2011)
Mortality Log of potential settler mortality, measured in terms of deaths
per annum per 1.000 ‘‘mean strength’’ of settlers
Acemoglu et al. (2001)
Urbanization % of population living in urban areas World Bank (2009)
Immigration International migrant stock (% of population) World Bank (2009)
Density Population density (people per km2) World Bank (2009)
Polity IV Average polity score (ranging from -10 to 10), with lower val-
ues indicating a less democratic or autocratic regimes (negative
values)
Marshall and Jaggers (2008)
Conﬂicts Years with summed magnitudes of all societal major events of
political violence (MEPV) higher than 1
Gleditsch et al. (2002)
Trade Log of trade (% of GDP) World Bank (2009)
Telephones Mobile and ﬁxed-line telephone subscribers (per 100 people) World Bank (2009)
GDP/capita
- Penn
Log of real GDP per capita in constant international dollars
(Laspeyres index)
Heston et al. (2009)
HDI Human Development Indicator, measures development along
three dimensions: healthy life, GDP/capita and education




% of population aged 15 and over that attained respective
school
Barro and Lee (2010)
Prim., Sec., Tert.
Completion
% of population aged 15 and over that completed respective
school
Barro and Lee (2010)
Prim., Sec., Tert.
Schooling
Average years of respective school attainment of population
aged 15 and over
Barro and Lee (2010)
∗ For better readability in regression tables, rescaled to decades.
32Table 4: Inﬂuence of geographic and historical variables on Atlas Narodov Mira
ELF scores in 1961 and 1985
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
ANM ’61 ANM ’61 ANM ’61 ANM ’61 ANM ’85 ANM ’85 ANM ’85 ANM ’85
Latitude -0.880*** -0.703*** -0.377 -0.718*** -0.610*** -0.461*** -0.376 -0.702***
(-8.51) (-5.93) (-1.44) (-5.32) (-5.66) (-4.14) (-1.44) (-5.04)
Altitude 0.101* 0.147** 0.149*** 0.203** 0.0664 0.143** 0.137*** 0.191**
(1.81) (1.99) (2.71) (2.54) (1.30) (2.34) (2.68) (2.40)
Area 0.0274*** 0.0411*** 0.0304** 0.0365* 0.0241*** 0.0409*** 0.0230* 0.0334*
(3.12) (4.05) (2.56) (2.00) (2.65) (4.16) (1.91) (1.82)
Agritime -0.0161** -0.0135 -0.00418 -0.00717 -0.0147* -0.0214** -0.00557 -0.00871
(-2.10) (-1.66) (-0.37) (-0.60) (-1.77) (-2.56) (-0.49) (-0.72)
Modern -0.0265*** -0.0227** -0.0274*** -0.0167*





Eastern Europe -0.0747 0.0991
(-1.34) (1.59)
Latin America -0.0975 -0.113
(-0.98) (-1.15)




Democratic Trad. 0.00598* 0.00890**
(1.70) (2.40)
cons 0.609*** 0.736*** 0.260 0.653*** 0.576*** 0.716*** 0.355* 0.608***
(9.42) (10.78) (1.29) (3.47) (8.95) (10.64) (1.80) (3.14)
N 130 114 124 66 158 142 151 66
adj. R2 0.462 0.516 0.544 0.427 0.279 0.385 0.350 0.359
F 38.62 25.30 32.31 13.07 17.79 21.05 12.24 10.46
Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors used; t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
33Table 5: Comparison between various ELF measures - inﬂuence of geographic
and historical variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
ANM ’61 ANM ’61 ANM ’85 ANM ’85 Alesina Alesina Fearon Fearon
Latitude -0.880*** -0.703*** -0.610*** -0.461*** -0.897*** -0.778*** -0.738*** -0.549***
(-8.51) (-5.93) (-5.66) (-4.14) (-8.46) (-7.80) (-7.08) (-5.39)
Altitude 0.101* 0.147** 0.0664 0.143** 0.0538 0.0978 0.0692 0.163***
(1.81) (1.99) (1.30) (2.34) (0.88) (1.25) (1.47) (2.83)
Area 0.0274*** 0.0411*** 0.0241*** 0.0409*** 0.0347*** 0.0440*** 0.0178* 0.0318***
(3.12) (4.05) (2.65) (4.16) (3.81) (4.66) (1.78) (3.11)
Agritime -0.0161** -0.0135 -0.0147* -0.0214** -0.00476 -0.00364 0.00303 -0.00901
(-2.10) (-1.66) (-1.77) (-2.56) (-0.55) (-0.43) (0.35) (-1.00)
Modern -0.0265*** -0.0274*** -0.0212*** -0.0291***
(-4.44) (-4.93) (-3.17) (-5.62)
cons 0.609*** 0.736*** 0.576*** 0.716*** 0.526*** 0.636*** 0.572*** 0.747***
(9.42) (10.78) (8.95) (10.64) (8.96) (9.29) (7.68) (9.89)
N 130 114 158 142 127 117 150 139
adj. R2 0.462 0.516 0.279 0.385 0.441 0.501 0.281 0.410
F 38.62 25.30 17.79 21.05 30.67 27.05 18.65 24.37
Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors used; t statistics in parentheses























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































5Table 7: Inﬂuence of socioeconomic and policy factors - dependent variable, change in Atlas Narodov Mira ELF scores
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
ANM change ANM change ANM change ANM change ANM change ANM change ANM change ANM change
Urbanization -0.0592** -0.0476* -0.118*** -0.0797*** -0.0990*** -0.0798*** -0.0610** -0.0597*
(-2.50) (-1.96) (-3.33) (-3.19) (-4.19) (-3.24) (-2.39) (-1.81)
Immigration 0.00589** 0.00543* 0.0116*** 0.00985*** 0.0112*** 0.0118*** 0.00537 0.00542*
(2.05) (1.91) (3.52) (3.48) (3.34) (3.86) (1.25) (1.85)
Density -0.0350 -0.0111 0.122* 0.0979 0.190*** 0.0758 -0.0224 -0.0154
(-0.49) (-0.16) (1.83) (1.53) (2.78) (1.21) (-0.37) (-0.22)
Primary Schooling -0.0559** -0.0442** -0.0434** -0.0558*** -0.0409** -0.0312* -0.0527**

















cons 0.0149 0.0703** 0.0557 0.0556 0.0446 0.0315 0.0670** 0.0540
(0.51) (2.14) (1.37) (1.54) (1.00) (0.77) (2.22) (1.13)
Level var. included yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
N 130 116 99 94 86 89 91 116
adj. R2 0.208 0.255 0.470 0.550 0.558 0.589 0.161 0.263
F 3.024 2.799 3.090 2.380 9.435 4.418 3.198 2.397
Included level variables (Zi): Latitude, Altitude, Area, Agritime and the ANM values in 1961
Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors used; t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
3
6Table 8: Inﬂuence of various economic and human development levels at the beginning of the period (average 1960-65) - dependent
variable, change in Atlas Narodov Mira ELF scores
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ANM ch. ANM ch. ANM ch. ANM ch. ANM ch. ANM ch.
Urbanization -0.0476* -0.0610** -0.0296 -0.0217 0.0228 0.0273
(-1.96) (-2.39) (-1.01) (-0.72) (0.64) (0.76)
Immigration 0.00543* 0.00537 0.00439 0.00442 0.00166 0.00148
(1.91) (1.25) (1.15) (1.15) (1.21) (1.14)
Density -0.0111 -0.0224 -0.00124 -0.0196 -0.0264 -0.0249
(-0.16) (-0.37) (-0.02) (-0.32) (-0.68) (-0.67)
Primary Schooling -0.0559** -0.0312* -0.0315* -0.0254 -0.0363** -0.0248
(-2.35) (-1.76) (-1.93) (-1.56) (-2.13) (-1.54)
GDP/cap. level (’60-’65) - Penn 0.0200* 0.0217**
(1.86) (1.99)
GDP/cap. - Penn -0.0204 -0.0285
(-0.97) (-1.39)




cons 0.0703** 0.0670** -0.112 -0.114 -0.0194 -0.00313
(2.14) (2.22) (-1.23) (-1.26) (-0.52) (-0.08)
Level var. included yes yes yes yes yes yes
N 116 91 91 91 98 98
adj. R2 0.255 0.161 0.194 0.197 0.182 0.222
F 2.799 3.198 2.924 3.053 3.290 3.219
Included level variables (Zi): Latitude, Altitude, Area, Agritime and the ANM values in 1961
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
3
7Table 9: Test of various other model speciﬁcations (ﬁxed eﬀects, random eﬀects) - dependent variable, change in Atlas Narodov Mira
ELF scores
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Fixed eﬀects Fixed eﬀects Fixed eﬀects Fixed eﬀects Random eﬀects Random eﬀects Random eﬀects Random eﬀects
Urbanization -0.0605** -0.108*** -0.0743*** -0.0601*** -0.0604*** -0.0732*** -0.0678*** -0.0492***
(-2.53) (-4.11) (-3.59) (-2.66) (-3.29) (-3.32) (-3.58) (-3.06)
Immigration 0.00582* 0.0128*** 0.0125*** 0.00477 0.00594** 0.00960** 0.0127*** 0.00424*
(1.95) (3.55) (4.23) (1.14) (2.03) (2.01) (5.11) (1.80)
Density -0.00963 0.142** 0.0590 -0.0390 -0.0431*** -0.0354 -0.0359** -0.0497***
(-0.15) (2.27) (1.18) (-0.88) (-3.08) (-1.63) (-2.28) (-3.55)
1975 0.0602*** 0.0314 0.0327* 0.0682*** 0.0643*** 0.0724*** 0.0682*** 0.0693***
(3.21) (1.54) (1.72) (3.84) (6.01) (5.85) (6.58) (6.52)
Primary Schooling -0.0496** -0.0518*** -0.0397** -0.0337** -0.0403*** -0.0430*** -0.0289*** -0.0351***





GDP/capita - Penn -0.0196 -0.0220
(-1.00) (-1.14)
cons 0.779*** 0.388* 0.539*** 1.008*** 0.858*** 0.892*** 0.799*** 1.024***
(4.77) (1.87) (3.58) (5.13) (13.97) (9.16) (12.01) (7.46)
N 243 198 206 210 243 198 206 210
adj. R2 0.278 0.554 0.618 0.218
F 4.253 10.84 6.484 4.765
r2 o 0.246 0.218 0.252 0.262
chi2 81.00 95.19 106.1 93.69
Cluster robust standard errors used; t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
3
8Table 10: Diﬀerences in various education measures - dependent variable, change in Atlas Narodov Mira ELF scores
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
ANM change ANM change ANM change ANM change ANM change ANM change ANM change
Urbanization -0.0476* -0.0227 -0.0559** -0.0376 -0.0359 -0.0256 -0.0252
(-1.96) (-0.89) (-2.17) (-1.54) (-1.43) (-0.97) (-0.96)
Immigration 0.00543* 0.00494* 0.00597* 0.00603** 0.00598** 0.00514* 0.00479*
(1.91) (1.85) (1.96) (2.10) (2.02) (1.82) (1.79)
Density -0.0111 -0.000276 -0.0297 -0.0381 -0.0354 -0.00142 0.0148
(-0.16) (-0.00) (-0.40) (-0.55) (-0.50) (-0.02) (0.20)




















cons 0.0703** 0.0493 0.0295 0.0428 0.0391 0.0148 0.0320
(2.14) (1.54) (0.83) (1.53) (1.24) (0.54) (1.06)
Level var. included yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
N 116 116 116 116 116 116 116
adj. R2 0.255 0.297 0.196 0.253 0.240 0.267 0.278
F 2.799 4.275 2.216 3.001 2.690 2.907 4.731
Included level variables (Zi): Latitude, Altitude, Area, Agritime and the ANM values in 1961
Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors used; t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
3
9Table 11: Alternative time frame 1960/65-1980/85 - dependent variable, change in ANM ELF scores
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
ANM change ANM change ANM change ANM change ANM change ANM change ANM change ANM change
Urbanization -0.0499** -0.0372* -0.0945*** -0.0666*** -0.0832*** -0.0586*** -0.0446** -0.0446*
(-2.52) (-1.93) (-3.15) (-3.42) (-4.11) (-2.71) (-2.20) (-1.70)
Immigration 0.00532** 0.00487** 0.00951*** 0.00830*** 0.00970*** 0.0107*** 0.00492 0.00491**
(2.26) (2.06) (3.37) (3.64) (3.34) (4.44) (1.38) (2.01)
Density -0.0327 -0.00617 0.0997* 0.0757 0.161*** 0.0360 -0.0152 -0.0119
(-0.60) (-0.11) (1.77) (1.49) (2.97) (0.76) (-0.33) (-0.22)
Primary Schooling -0.0448** -0.0398** -0.0403** -0.0504*** -0.0420*** -0.0287** -0.0438**

















cons 0.0162 0.0736** 0.0614 0.0646* 0.0516 0.0857* 0.0710** 0.0578
(0.52) (2.36) (1.53) (1.88) (1.19) (1.80) (2.44) (1.25)
Level var. included yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
N 130 116 99 94 85 90 91 116
adj. R2 0.219 0.275 0.465 0.560 0.576 0.583 0.197 0.286
F 3.456 3.489 2.592 2.562 8.009 4.974 3.892 2.717
Included level variables (Zi): Latitude, Altitude, Area, Agritime and the ANM values in 1961
Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors used; t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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